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‘There is some justification at least in the taunt
that many of the pretending defenders of “free
enterprise” are in fact defenders of privileges and
advocates of government activity in their favour
rather than opponents of all privilege’ – Hayek
(1948: 107)
.A. Hayek was a European economist and social
philosopher who first came to scholarly prominence
for his work on trade cycles and his disagreements
with John Maynard Keynes; and who earned wider
intellectual notice (if not notoriety) for his
polemics warning of the threat to western
civilisation posed by modern socialism. His
economic writings in the 1930s aimed,
more than anything, at exposing the flaws
and contradictions in socialism as an
economic system. His polemic, The Road
to Serfdom, published in 1944 with a
dedication to ‘The Socialists of All Parties’,
was an attempt to turn around the thinking
of western policy-makers he thought too
easily seduced by the claims of central
economic planning. And his treatise, The
Constitution of Liberty, published in 1960
with a dedication to ‘The Unknown
Civilisation Growing in America’, attempted to set out in
a systematic way – and defend – the principles of classical
liberalism, which he understood as a political philosophy
which had evolved with the ‘progress’ of European
civilisation over the past several hundred years. Hayek did
not travel much in Asia, though he visited Japan and was
happy to see his work translated and discussed there; nor
did he write anything substantial about Asia. There is a
passing reference to Confucius in Law, Legislation and
Liberty, but little else that might suggest any significant
acquaintance with Asian thinkers or Asian philosophy.
None of this is to criticise Hayek – though it is
remarkable that a public intellectual of his prominence
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and productivity, who lived half his life in the post-colonial
era, should have had so little to say about a world which
underwent so profound a transformation after the second
world war, and which was so much the subject of European
political debate and policy. Life is short, and time is
precious; and Hayek was a man with many fish to fry. But
this does pose an obvious question: can Hayek, then, have
anything to offer Asia?
In one sense, of course, the question is put in too bald
and clumsy a way. What, after all, is ‘Asia’ – this region
encompassing almost everything east of Istanbul as far as
Japan? And why should one even think that
a philosopher needs to have written about
or visited those who might learn from his
work? After all, Newton’s laws work as well
on either side of the Bosphorus; so, surely,
should the laws of economics? Yet these
obvious observations notwithstanding, the
question should be raised, partly because
it is odd that Hayek took so little interest
in Asia, but, more importantly, because we
live in circumstances in which many are
all too willing to seize on Hayek’s European
sensibility to deny his relevance or interest
outside the western world. And not entirely
without reason: it would be hard to defend
the view that western experts sent out to advise Asian rulers
on how to ‘modernise’ their societies have done less harm
than good. It is surely nothing but good sense to be
suspicious of advice coming from people who are ignorant
of one’s history, traditions, and circumstances.
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Yet Hayek does have something to offer. For there is a
great deal to be learnt from his thought by anyone
interested in the problems confronting societies like
Malaysia, Singapore, India, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia.
Now the first thought this proposition might bring to
mind is the idea that Hayek offers something here because
his message is that freedom and prosperity are the products
of free markets. Hayek, the excoriator of socialism, offers,
above all, an explanation of why the capitalist road is the
path which, though typically less travelled, is the path
which will make all the difference. And undoubtedly, there
is something in this. But equally, there are many
economists saying such things, and there is no reason to
turn to Hayek for this. If he is worth listening to, it is
because he has a more profound and subtle message to
present – one which should make us wary of simple
answers, whether they come from social planners or
advocates of laissez-faire economic policy. Indeed, from
the very outset of his career as an economist, Hayek
maintained that the thinkers in the classical tradition erred
in allowing ‘the impression to gain ground that laissez-
faire was their ultimate and only conclusion’, and insisted
that to ‘remedy this deficiency must be one of the main
tasks of the future’ (Hayek 1933: 134). And, in the paper
which opened discussion at the first meeting of the Mont
Pelerin Society in 1947, he pointedly observed that we
must ‘above all beware of the error that the formulas
“private property” and “freedom of contract” solve our
problems. They are not adequate answers because their
meaning is ambiguous’ (Hayek 1948: 113).
Yet all this is only about what Hayek does not tell us.
The question remains: what does he have to offer? Before
trying to answer this question in a systematic way, it is
worth noting first, what the problems and concerns of
most modern Asian societies are. Two problems seem to
be pre-eminent: how to achieve a measure of material
prosperity, and how to secure at the same time a reasonable
level of political stability. The concern shared by many
Asian societies, at the same time, is that this is difficult to
achieve without sacrificing the culture, the traditions, the
values, the ways of life, that are Asian. If modernisation
means being remade in the image of the west, then, for
many, the price is too high.
What Hayek has to offer those with these concerns is
not a solution, or a blueprint for reform, or a list of do’s
and don’ts. What he has to offer is a way of thinking: an
insight into the way in which we should look at the world
if we are properly to address the concerns of modern society
– and, so, of modern Asian societies. The key to the
Hayekian world-view is a conviction about the limitations
of human reason: individuals are, by and large, ignorant,
and incapable of shaping or controlling their environment
with sufficient assurance as to control their destiny. On
the face of it, this seems obvious enough. But Hayek’s
concern throughout his work is to draw out the
implications of this. And to do so, he elaborates not so
much a theory of human fallibility (though that is a part
of his story) as an account of the nature of human
knowledge and the processes by which it is utilised and,
indeed, acquired.
The use of knowledge in society
Hayek’s first attempt systematically to elaborate the theory
which was to become the foundation of his social
philosophy was in his essay, ‘The Use of Knowledge in
Society’.1 There he posed the question: what is the problem
we wish to solve when we try to construct a rational
economic order? The kind of answer we are most tempted
to give, he observed, is to say that, if we possess all the
relevant information, if we can start out from a given
system of preferences, and if we have complete knowledge
of available means, the problem is, in principle, soluble.
The trouble is, Hayek argued, this is not the economic
problem society faces.
The reason this is not the problem, Hayek insisted, is
that the ‘data’ which we use to make a start at tackling the
task of working out how to allocate goods or resources are
‘never for the whole society “given” to a single mind which
could work out the implications and can never be so
given.’(Hayek 1948: 77). The peculiar character of the
problem of a rational economic order, he goes on to say,
‘is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of
the circumstances of which we must make use never exists
in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the
dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory
knowledge which all separate individuals possess.’ Some
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1   First published in American Economic Review, 35 (4) September 1945: 519-30; reprinted in Hayek (1948: 77-91).
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of the knowledge we possess in society is undoubtedly in
the form of ‘scientific’ knowledge. When dealing with
scientific knowledge we may do well to assume that a body
of suitably chosen ‘experts’ is most likely to be able to
command the best knowledge available. But the trouble
is, Hayek explains, ‘scientific knowledge is not the sum of
all knowledge’(p. 80). Indeed, the most important body
of knowledge in society is
‘unorganised knowledge’: knowledge
of particular circumstances of time
and place. And this is knowledge
which is not the exclusive possession
of the expert but the property of
many. With respect to this form of
knowledge, ‘practically every
individual has some advantage over
all others because he possesses unique
information of which beneficial use
might be made, but of which use can
be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to
him or are made with his active co-operation.’(p.80). The
most important form of knowledge in society is not expert
knowledge but practical, local knowledge: ‘knowledge of
people, of local conditions, and of special circumstances.’
Now, in some ways this is all too obvious: as Hayek
points out, we need only consider how much we learn in
any job after we have completed our ‘theoretical’ training,
or how big a part of our working life is spent learning
particular jobs, to realise that much of the most useful
knowledge we acquire we do so in situ. And much of our
knowledge is quite obviously knowledge of a fleeting kind
– the kind which cannot be
conveyed to any authority in
statistical form. ‘The shipper who
earns his living from using
otherwise empty or half-filled
journeys of stamp-steamers, or
the estate agent whose whole
knowledge is almost exclusively
one of temporary opportunities,
or the arbitrageur who gains from
local differences of commodity
prices – are all performing
eminently useful functions based
on special knowledge of
circumstances of the fleeting
moment not known to
others.’(Hayek 1948: 80). Yet it
is the significance of the obvious,
not the obviousness, which is the focus of Hayek’s concern.
The significance of these obvious observations about
the nature of much of our knowledge is that they tell us
something about what we can and cannot do, and, so,
about the kinds of institutions which are desirable and
feasible in a well-ordered society. The first lesson is that
there is a limit to how much can be achieved by social
planners who wish to shape society –
or to reconstruct it in accordance with
some particular design. The reality is
that too much of social life is simply
lived beyond the horizons of planners
and designers. Economic planners, to
the extent that they must attempt to
do their jobs, will always have to find
some way to let a good many
decisions be taken by the ‘man on the
spot’. This is the lesson which it was
the explicit concern of Hayek the
economist to present. It is the core of his teaching in all
his works explaining why socialism – economic production
and distribution without markets and money prices – was
strictly impossible; for socialism was unable to make
adequate use of most of the knowledge needed for
economic co-ordination.2
But there is also a deeper lesson to be drawn: one which
points to more important reasons why Hayek has
something significant to offer. The dispersed or scattered,
the local, and the practical nature of our knowledge, in
Hayek’s understanding, is a feature not only of our
knowledge of opportunities or resources or possibilities
but of most kinds of knowledge we have. It is a feature of
our knowledge of one another, of human behaviour, of
our beliefs, and even of our preferences. What Hayek
wanted to resist was a model of economic thinking – and
of thinking about society – which assumed that there
existed unchanging economic agents with established
preferences for whom the economic problem was how to
get what they wanted. In reality, the limits of human
knowledge are also limits of self-knowledge or self-
understanding. For there is no fixed subject with perfect
knowledge of itself and its desires or preferences. To put it
in everyday terms, people are constantly trying to find
out not only how to get what they want, but also what
they do in fact want.  What they learn on this score they
learn through practical attempts to satisfy themselves; and
what they learn is invariably dependant on local
circumstances, which teach different people different
things about what is good, or desirable, or worthwhile.
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Hayek is known, if for nothing else, for his defence of
the free market – of capitalism. And certainly, much of
what he has written has been about the coordinating
powers of markets, and their capacity to generate wealth.
But the more important side of Hayek’s thought is that
side which emphasises not economic growth or economic
development but what we might call human development.
The free market – or, better, the free society – is important
not because it brings about a higher Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) but because it is a society in which people
get an opportunity to find out what they value.
Competition, Hayek argued, was a ‘discovery procedure’;
but what was discovered in that process was not only how
goods could be most economically produced but what
was actually desirable.
What Hayek is trying to say is that the
well-ordered society is one in which social
institutions recognise not only that
economic production cannot be directed
by social planners, but also that society’s
values cannot be centrally planned. There
is no science which can settle the question
of what is worthwhile.
Free economies and free civilisations
Now, of what use, or interest is all this to
modern Asian societies? After
all, what they surely need –
according to their own political
elites and according to many of
their western advisors – is
economic development. Some
think that the way to secure it is
to follow the prescriptions of the
International Monetary Fund;
while others, like Dr Mahathir,
think a judicious mix of market
incentives and pragmatic
intervention a better bet. But
they are agreed on the objectives; and the objectives are
surely sound? What’s the use of Hayek here?
What Hayek has to offer, I suggest, is a more radical
perspective on many of these questions. For what Hayek’s
thought suggests is that the most important issues we need
to address are not economic ones. Our concern should
not be with the problem of how to build economies or
achieve economic targets – even if such matters are not
without significance. Hayek has always taken the view
that economics is not what matters, ultimately. ‘Economic
considerations are merely those by which we reconcile and
adjust our different purposes, none of which, in the last
resort, are economic’ (Hayek 1976: 35).
Once again, this seems so obvious that it is worth a
little more careful consideration to see why there is a more
substantial point to be considered here than first meets
the eye. Hayek’s concern, in the end, has not been to defend
the market or the economy but to defend freedom. Here
two things need explaining: what kind of freedom? and
why? On the first score, Hayek makes it clear in The
Constitution of Liberty that it would be a mistake to confine
freedom to the intellectual sphere, important though it
may be to preserve freedom of speech. ‘Though the
c o n s c i o u s
manipulation of
abstract thought,
once it has been set
in train, has in
some measure a life
of its own, it would
not long continue
and develop
without the
constant challenges
that arise from the
ability of people to
act in a new
manner, to try new
ways of doing things, and to alter the whole structure of
civilisation in adaptation to change.’ (Hayek 1976: 35).
Freedom’s importance, moreover, does not depend on the
elevated character of the activities it makes possible.
‘Freedom of action, even in humble things, is as important
as freedom of thought.’
Why is freedom important? Hayek’s answer is not that
free markets are more likely to produce prosperity – though
he would undoubtedly agree that they do – but that
freedom is essential if human civilisation is to prevail. For
Hayek, civilisation is not something produced by markets,
or which is the product of economic success, but rather
something that exists when human beings are able to use
the knowledge they have to pursue their own purposes,
whether severally or alone. It is intimately tied to progress;
but again, not progress in the sense of economic growth
or development but in the (somewhat vaguer) sense of
human development. It is tied to the development of
human reason and human creative powers.3 But civilisation
THE ASIAN WAY: A HAYEKIAN PERSPECTIVE
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The free society is important
not because it brings about a
higher GDP but because
it is a society in which
people get an opportunity
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is not an end-state, or a goal towards which we must strive,
and at which we can arrive. Civilisation is a state in which
what we find are human beings acting, or struggling, to
adapt to constantly changing circumstances, learning to
solve the problems that changes bring. It is a state of
constant movement. ‘[C]ivilisation is progress and progress
is civilisation’, Hayek (1976: 39) tells us. And progress is
not movement towards a pre-determined end-state.
‘Progress is movement for movement’s sake.’(Hayek 1976:
41).
In the Hayekian world-view, there is no point in
thinking about the progress of
civilisation in terms of some future
end-state in which our aims will have
been attained. Civilisation is a
condition in which we constantly
strive to adjust to new circumstances,
but in which everything is subject to
change which is more or less
unpredictable. Our wishes and aims
are themselves subject to change, in
large measure through the processes
of adaptation. And in these
circumstances the only thing Hayek
counsels against is the temptation to seek to control this
process, or to direct it towards particular ends. The reason
is that this threatens to undermine the capacity of people,
and society more generally, to do what they have to do:
adapt to the circumstances in which they find themselves,
using what knowledge they have to pursue their various
purposes.
In reality, of course, human beings do this all the time.
This is not so much because they constantly seek to
organise themselves to pursue particular shared ends.
Organisation is an important and necessary tool. But they
also do this in ways which Hayek sees as troubling: by
creating ‘exclusive, privileged, monopolistic
organisation[s]’, which are often used to prevent others
from trying to do better (Hayek 1976: 37). At their worst,
they try to do this by taking control of societies on large
scales, and directing them towards particular ends – and
then trying to make people fit those ends for which they
must be reconstructed. From time to time, Hayek suggests,
human beings will come to realise the folly of this, and
will abandon such ambitions to control social processes.
But, he notes pessimistically, they will also, from time to
time come to believe they can control social development:
something which ‘may well prove a hurdle which man
will repeatedly reach, only to be thrown back into
barbarism.’(Hayek 1952: 163). The task of the social
philosopher is to point this out, and to try to avert – or at
least to delay – the onset of folly.
Hayek is, in other words, a profoundly anti-utopian
thinker. What he offers is not a promise of a glorious future
state but a warning against excessive expectations. His
philosophy of classical liberalism offers a theory of
economic and political institutions which describes, not
an ideal society, but the conditions necessary for something
more modest: the continuation of a secure everyday life.
The use of Hayek in Asia
This brings us back to the matter of
what it is that Hayek’s thought has
to offer modern Asian societies,
particularly since, on the face of it,
Hayek’s concern is to warn European
societies of the problems of socialism.
Hayek has a great deal to offer.
But it should be noted at the outset
that one of the reasons why this is so
is that, his European concerns
notwithstanding, he is above all an
internationalist. The conception of a
liberal social order expounded in his
political theory is a conception of the ‘great society’: an
‘extended order of human co-operation’ which takes no
special heed of national boundaries. Hayek’s concerns, and
prescriptions, are in no sense culture-bound.
The more important reason Hayek has something to
offer, however, is that the core of his social thought presses
forward an idea which not only makes a good deal of
sense, but which also should be congenial to many modern
societies – even if not necessarily to their rulers. This is
the idea that the good society is not a society shaped or
designed by elites but rather is one in which social life is
the product of local knowledge. And local knowledge here
encompasses knowledge not only of techniques and
opportunities but also of customs and values. For what
Hayek has tried to teach, above all, is that a good society
will not suppress the local understanding of things but
allow it the scope to enable ordinary people to adjust to
their circumstances. It is the ‘synoptic vision’ beloved of
elites which is the danger.
If there is anything which has proven harmful to
developing societies, however, it has been the ambitions
and schemes of modernisers: schemes for the national
organisation of agriculture, or industry, or even (more
recently) of culture. This century in particular has seen
innumerable utopian schemes (from the Great Leap
Forward in China to compulsory ujaama villages in
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Tanzania) which have, at their worst, brought death and
misery to millions. What Hayek offers is an explanation
of why this is so, why this poses a threat to civilisation,
and what shape social and political institutions would have
to take if these schemes are to be avoided.
The Hayekian perspective on the perils of modern,
state-led development has been explored with particular
thoroughness by James Scott (1998). Scott analyses the
numerous failures of large-scale authoritarian plans and
comes to the conclusion that they failed, in the end,
because the planners’ visions could not comprehend the
complex interdependencies that existed in local
communities, and thus the systems of relations which
made those societies work. Planners had assumed that
scientific knowledge – the hard, statistical, knowledge
available to those with the synoptic view – would bring
order (and prosperity) to what appeared from afar to be a
messy, disorganised, and inefficient local life. Yet what
was disorder to the planner ignorant of the purposes of
those living in actual communities was far from that to
the members of such communities. And the cost of
attempts to bring order through schemes of national
development often made for worse lives for those who
bore the consequences. Indigenous people forced to move
to make way for forest industries, or farmers forced to
make way for large-scale plantations,
or villagers forced to relocate in the
name of rural development are some
of the examples of the casualties of
such schemes.
Even when the costs of such
schemes in human terms has not
been as horrendous as it has been in
cases like the Great Leap Forward,
the benefits have been doubtful. For
example, since colonial times there
has been a distinct preference for
plantation agriculture over
smallholder production – in spite of
the fact that, for most crops
(excepting sugar cane) smallholders
outcompeted larger enterprises. Small producers, with low
fixed costs, and access to family labour, consistently
undersold state-managed and large private-sector
plantations. In these circumstances, it was no advantage
in Malaya persistently to favour rubber estates. Yet to
preserve the uneconomic rubber estates, smallholder
production was limited. The beneficiaries, in this instance,
were colonial and metropolitan investors. But the more
important reason for such policies was that the
preservation of large estates served better the purpose of
the state: to monitor and tax. Large producers were easier
targets of tax collection than small growers ‘who were here
today and gone tomorrow and whose landholdings,
production and profits were illegible to the state.’(Scott
1998: 189). The cost of all this was not only lower
production but also the destruction of the livelihoods of
many small producers – people who were not to be allowed
to make use of their own, local, knowledge for their own
particular purposes. The costs were born by those who
had to accept higher prices for rubber, and also by those
small producers who saw their incomes eroded. The
gainers were the state, and its favourites.
What Hayek’s thought offers is not only an account of
why this kind of social organisation is likely to lower
productivity but also why it is bad for society and people
more generally. Forms of social organisation which make
such schemes the  norm sustain regimes of privilege, not
regimes which are, in the end, sensitive to the lives of
ordinary people.
Now, one obvious objection which will be made here
is that the Hayekian philosophy, in spite of its claims to
the contrary, presents what is essentially a conservative
view of the world – and a western conservative view at
that. What it fails to recognise is that
today’s world is a modern world, and
one in which developing countries
and all their members, have to catch
up if they are to be able to enjoy lives
of any sort of prosperity.
Development programs, and
modernisation generally, may force
unwelcome change upon people; but
this is necessary. Western intellectuals
might think romantically about the
lives of the Orang Asli of Malaysia,
and think it wrong to force them to
assimilate into the nation’s society, but
this conservative attitude will not help
them live healthier, and longer, lives
than they do now.
Yet it would be a mistake to think that Hayek’s stance
is a conservative one that is resistant to change. This is
not simply because he has stated explicitly that he is not a
conservative.4 It is rather because the whole thrust of
Hayek’s social theory is to say how important it is to make
change possible. Hayek’s argument against central
planning and grand, state-led development schemes, is
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they are, in the end, too
resistant to it.
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maintaining a regime in which the conflicts and
disagreements among them are also allowed to be voiced
– particularly so that differences may be considered and
compromises and changes made by people
responding to their changed circumstances.
In fact, what passes for Asian values is little
more than a set of assertions tied to a
manufactured national sentiment. They are
weapons of social control, used by elites
who wish to silence dissenters and critics.
The more genuine commitment to
Asian values would be more readily found
in a Hayekian regime, in which social
institutions upheld the freedom of Asians
to use their knowledge to pursue their own
purposes, and to shape or live by their
traditions as they understand them.
Indeed, if Hayek has anything to teach, it
is that this is something that is more
important than many advocates of Asian
values, or Asian development, have realised.
Conclusion
It would not do to exaggerate Hayek’s Asian sensibilities.
Hayek was, in the end, a European philosopher. But what
is also worth bearing in mind is that he was a European
who was extraordinarily critical of those European ideas
which  have dominated the twentieth century: ideas of
socialism and of the state as national planner. He was a
critic of the scientistic attitude which presumed that the
most important form of knowledge was theoretical
knowledge.  If Hayek has something important to say to
Asian societies – to the newly developed and developing
countries of the east – it is that they should not be too
easily seduced by the west. Or at least, by those western
ideas which have proved least hospitable to the cause of
freedom and individual being.
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not that they promote change but that they are, in the
end, too resistant to it. The reason this is so is that the
structures which are least responsive to the demands for
change are the large, rigid, creations of
central planners with no knowledge of local
conditions and circumstances. Hayek’s ‘man
on the spot’ is the most likely person to make
changes because his plans – and perhaps his
livelihood – depend on his capacity to adjust
to changing circumstances. In a free society,
local actors and communities will constantly
be changing as they adapt to the changing
environment. Over time, and over large
areas, the cumulative effect of these small
changes may well bring about more
profound social transformations. This is
neither something to be celebrated nor cause
for dismay. It is simply the way of the world.
But in this way, those whose lives are at stake
have the opportunity to adjust so that their
lives are kept intact – and, perhaps, improved.
In the end, what Hayek puts is a case for individual
freedom; and the institutions which uphold this best are,
above all, those institutions which make
for the rule of law: institutions which limit the capacity
of any agency, notably government, to try to shape society
in arbitrary and unaccountable ways. But the other
important criticism that will be made of Hayek, and those
who agree with his principles of classical liberalism, is that
all of this presupposes that the western model of politics
(and of economic development) is one that Asian societies
ought uncritically to adopt. Yet western capitalism may
not be suitable for the very different societies of the east.
Indeed, if local knowledge and traditions are important,
surely Asian societies should find their own ways –
developing their own models of capitalist development.
This view has been put not only by various Asian leaders,
from Dr Mahathir to Lee Kuan Yew, but also by
philosophers such as John Gray.
Here it is important to see that, despite their claims to
be defending Asian values, or the rights of Asian societies
to develop their own models, these politicians and their
intellectual defenders really have very little appreciation
of the importance of the local. While they might assert an
allegiance to regional cultural traditions and mores, in
reality they are simply western ‘high-modernists’.
Authoritarian control is asserted in the name of Asian
values. But a real respect for such values would be better
evident by recognising that values are diverse, and local.
Asian peoples hold to different cultural beliefs and
traditions. Moreover, a respect for them would suggest
THE ASIAN WAY: A HAYEKIAN PERSPECTIVE
